Collapse by Vladislav M. Zubok

Author:Vladislav M. Zubok
Language: eng
Format: epub, azw3
ISBN: 9780300262445
Publisher: Yale University Press

KRYUCHKOV’S BLUNDER

The Emergency Committee, or GKChP, could have gained popular legitimacy if only it had showed overwhelming power. This was a clear lesson to be learned from many coups around the world—and a lesson from Russian history. Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB, was no stranger to violence. In Budapest in 1956, he had watched Soviet tanks crush the anti-communist revolution. In 1979, KGB commandos had assassinated the leader of Afghanistan in a prelude to the Soviet occupation. In 1981, Kryuchkov had advised General Jaruzelski on his introduction of martial law in Poland: the entire opposition leadership and thousands of activists were then arrested overnight. This experience, however, had made Kryuchkov aware of the high political and economic costs associated with brute force. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the crackdown in Poland had triggered Western sanctions.25

Kryuchkov considered his current dilemma. Arresting Yeltsin and other elected Russian officials could lead to a storm of indignation in the West, even a return to the Cold War. The Soviet economy and budget could not afford to endure Western sanctions. Kryuchkov also knew that Yazov, Yanayev, and Lukyanov were not ready for violence. They could only be convinced of the need for emergency rule by gradual step-by-step tactics, capitalizing on their common responsibility. When Defense Minister Yazov decided to send hundreds of tanks into Moscow’s streets as a show of force, Kryuchkov did not object. He faked an “intelligence report” claiming that an armed opposition allegedly wanted to seize control of Moscow. The KGB leader counted on the instincts of Soviet citizens to welcome a strong hand at a time of rising disorder and economic crisis. Two years later, Yeltsin would say: “The cunning apparatchik from the intelligence services reasoned with good sense.”26

In the small hours of Monday, 19 August, Kryuchkov convened the KGB Collegium. General Shebarshin jotted down instructions: “The task is to preserve an integrated financial and currency system . . . We will move to the market, but not a wild market. Foreign interference must not be allowed. There will be no signing of the Union Treaty: we cannot leap from one state to another immediately.” Kryuchkov telephoned the leaders of Soviet republics and some autonomous regions, telling them to abort their trips to Moscow, since the treaty ceremony had been canceled.27

He also called Kravchuk. Ukraine was the key republic to keep under Soviet control. The Ukrainian leader received the call in his office, where he was sitting with Stanislav Hurenko, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and General Varennikov. The general had just told the Ukrainian officials that “power at last is in the hands of resolute and brave people.” He demanded that the Ukrainian parliament introduce martial law in Kiev, Lvov, Odessa, and in Western regions of Ukraine “where the Soviet power has collapsed.” Kravchuk felt shocked and defenseless, but he objected to martial law as needlessly provocative. When Kryuchkov called, Kravchuk timidly asked if the state of emergency was constitutional. One hour later Varennikov informed Kryuchkov: “Kravchuk and other comrades agreed with the proposals.

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